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Abstract A well-known ambiguity in the term ‘argument’ is that of argument as
an inferential structure and argument as a kind of dialogue. In the first sense, an
argument is a structure with a conclusion supported by one or more grounds, which
may or may not be supported by further grounds. Rules for the construction and
criteria for the quality of arguments in this sense are a matter of logic. In the second
sense, arguments have been studied as a form of dialogical interaction, in which
human or artificial agents aim to resolve a conflict of opinion by verbal means.
Rules for conducting such dialogues and criteria for their quality are part of dia-
logue theory. Usually, formal accounts of argumentation dialogues in logic and
artificial intelligence presuppose an argument-based logic. That is, the ways in
which dialogue participants support and attack claims are modelled as the con-
struction of explicit arguments and counterarguments (in the inferential sense).
However, in this paper formal models of argumentation dialogues are discussed that
do not presuppose arguments as inferential structures. The motivation for such
models is that there are forms of inference that are not most naturally cast in the
form of arguments (such as abduction, statistical reasoning and coherence-based
reasoning) but that can still be the subject of argumentative dialogue. Some recent
work in artificial intelligence is discussed which embeds non-argumentative infer-
ence in an argumentative dialogue system, and some general observations are drawn
from this discussion.
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A well-known ambiguity in the term ‘argument’ is that of argument as an
inferential structure and argument as a kind of dialogue. In the first sense, an
argument is a structure with a conclusion supported by one or more grounds, which
may or may not be supported by further grounds. Rules for the construction and
criteria for the quality of arguments in this sense are a matter of logic. In the
second sense, arguments have been studied as a form of dialogical interaction, in
which human or artificial agents aim to resolve a conflict of opinion by verbal
means. Rules for conducting such dialogues and criteria for their quality are part of
dialogue theory.
Both logic and dialogue theory can be developed by formal as well as informal
means. This paper takes the formal stance, studying the relation between formal-
logical and formal-dialogical accounts of argument. While formal logic has a long
tradition, the first formal dialogue systems for argumentation where proposed in the
1970s, notably by the argumentation theorists Hamblin (1970, 1971); Woods and
Walton (1978) and Mackenzie (1979). In the 1990s AI researchers also became
interested in dialogue systems for argumentation. In AI & Law they are studied as a
way to model legal procedure (e.g. Gordon 1995; Lodder 1999; Prakken 2008),
while in the field of multi-agent systems they have been proposed as protocols for
agent interaction (e.g. Parsons et al. 2003). All this work implicitly or explicitly
assumes an underlying logic. In early work in argumentation theory the logic
assumed was monotonic: the dialogue participants were assumed to build a single
argument (in the inferential sense) for their claims, which could only be criticised by
asking for further justification of an argument’s premise or by demanding resolution
of inconsistent premises. AI has added to this the possibility of attacking arguments
with counterarguments; the logic assumed by AI models of argumentative dialogues
is thus nonmonotonic. Nevertheless, it is still argument-based, since counterargu-
ments conform to the same inferential structure as the arguments that they attack.
However, I shall argue that formal systems for argumentation dialogues are
possible without presupposing arguments and counterarguments as inferential
structures. The motivation for such systems is that there are forms of inference that
are not most naturally cast in the form of arguments (e.g. abduction, statistical
reasoning or coherence-based reasoning) but that can still be the subject of
argumentative dialogue, that is, of a dialogue that aims to resolve a conflict of
opinion. This motivates the notion of a theory-building dialogue, in which the
participants jointly build some inferential structure during a dialogue, which
structure need not be argument-based. Argumentation without arguments is then
possible since, even if the theory built during a dialogue is not argument-based, the
dialogue still aims to resolve a conflict of opinion.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 the basics are described of logics
and dialogue systems for argumentation, and their relation is briefly discussed.
Then in Sect. 3 the general idea of theory-building dialogues is introduced and in
Sect. 4 some general principles for regulating such dialogues are presented. In




2 Logical and Dialogical Systems for Argumentation
In this section I briefly describe the basics of formal argumentation logics and
formal dialogue systems for argumentation, and I explain how the former can be
used as a component of the latter. A recent collection of introductory articles on
argumentation logics and their use in formal dialogue systems for argumentation
can be found in Rahwan and Simari (2009). An informal discussion of the same
topics can be found in Prakken (2010).
2.1 Argumentation Logics
Logical argumentation systems formalise defeasible, or presumptive reasoning as
the construction and comparison of arguments for and against certain conclusions.
The defeasibility of arguments arises from the fact that new information may give
rise to new counterarguments that defeat the original argument. That an argument
A defeats an argument B informally means that A is in conflict with, or attacks B and
is not weaker than B. The relative strength between arguments is determined with
any standard that is appropriate to the problem at hand and may itself be the subject
of argumentation. In general, three kinds of attack are distinguished: arguing for a
contradictory conclusion (rebutting attack), arguing that an inference rule has an
exception (undercutting attack), or denying a premise (premise-attack). Note that if
two arguments attack each other and are equally strong, then they defeat each other.
Inference in argumentation logics is defined relative to what Dung (1995) calls an
argumentation framework, that is, a given set of arguments ordered by a defeat
relation. It can be defined in various ways. For argumentation theorists perhaps the
most attractive form is that of an argument game. In such a game a proponent and
opponent of a claim exchange arguments and counterarguments to defend,
respectively attack the claim. An example of such a game is the following (which
is the game for Dung’s 1995 so-called grounded semantics; cf. Prakken and Sartor
1997; Modgil and Caminada 2009). The proponent starts with the argument to be
tested and then the players take turns: at each turn the players must defeat the other
player’s last argument: moreover, the proponent must do so with a stronger
argument, i.e., his argument may not in turn be defeated by its target. Finally, the
proponent is not allowed to repeat his arguments. A player wins the game if the
other player has no legal reply to his last argument.
What counts in an argument game is not whether the proponent in fact wins a
game but whether he has a winning strategy, that is, whether he can win whatever
arguments the opponent chooses to play. In the game for grounded semantics this
means that the proponent has a winning strategy if he can always make the opponent
run out of replies. If the proponent has such a winning strategy for an argument, then
the argument is called justified. Moreover, an argument is overruled if it is not
justified and defeated by a justified argument, and it is defensible if it is not justified
but none of its defeaters is justified. So, for example, if two arguments defeat each
other and no other argument defeats them, they are both defensible. The status of
arguments carries over to statements as follows: a statement is justified if it is the
conclusion of a justified argument, it is defensible if it is not justified and the
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conclusion of a defensible argument, and it is overruled if all arguments for it are
overruled. (Recall that these statuses are relative to a given argumentation
framework.)
Argument games should not be confused with dialogue systems for argumen-
tation: an argument game just computes the status of arguments and statements with
respect to a nonmonotonic inference relation and its proponent and opponent are just
metaphors for the dialectical form of such computations. By contrast, dialogue
systems for argumentation are meant to resolve conflicts of opinion between
genuine agents (whether human or artificial).
2.2 Dialogue Systems for Argumentation
The formal study of dialogue systems for argumentation was initiated by Charles
Hamblin (1971) and developed by e.g. Woods and Walton (1978); Mackenzie
(1979) and Walton and Krabbe (1995). From the early 1990s researchers in artificial
intelligence (AI) also became interested in the dialogical side of argumentation (see
Prakken 2006 for an overview of research in both areas). Of particular interest for
present purposes are so-called persuasion dialogues, where two parties try to resolve
a conflict of opinion. Dialogue systems for persuasive argumentation aim to
promote fair and effective resolution of such conflicts. They have a communication
language, which defines the well-formed utterances or speech acts, and which is
wrapped around a topic language in which the topics of dispute can be described
(Walton and Krabbe 1995 call the combination of these two languages the ‘locution
rules’). The topic language is governed by a logic, which can be standard, deductive
logic or a nonmonotonic logic. The communication language usually at least
contains speech acts for claiming, challenging, conceding and retracting proposi-
tions and for moving arguments and (if the logic of the topic language is
nonmonotonic) counterarguments. It is governed by a protocol, i.e., a set of rules for
when a speech act may be uttered and by whom (by Walton and Krabbe 1995 called
the ‘structural rules’). It also has a set of effect rules, which define the effect of an
utterance on the state of a dialogue (usually on the dialogue participants’
commitments, which is why Walton and Krabbe 1995 call them ‘commitment
rules’). Finally, a dialogue system defines termination and outcome of a dispute. In
argumentation theory the usual definition is that a dialogue terminates with a win for
the proponent of the initial claim if the opponent concedes that claim, while it
terminates with a win for opponent if proponent retracts his initial claim (see e.g.
Walton and Krabbe 1995). However, other definitions are possible.
2.3 The Relation Between Logical and Dialogical Systems for Argumentation
A stated in the introduction, formal dialogue systems for persuasive argumentation
assume an underlying logic. In argumentation theory it is usually left implicit but in
AI it is almost always an explicit component of dialogue systems. Also, in early
work in argumentation theory the logic assumed was monotonic: the dialogue
participants were assumed to build a single argument (in the inferential sense) for
their claims, which could only be criticised by asking for further justification of an
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argument’s premise (a premise challenge) or by demanding resolution of
inconsistent premises. (In some systems, such as Walton and Krabbe’s (1995)
PPD, the participants can build arguments for contradictory initial assertions, but
they still cannot attack arguments with counterarguments.) If a premise challenge is
answered with further grounds for the premise, the argument is in effect
‘backwards’ extended into a step-by step-constructed inference tree.
Consider by way of example the following dialogue, which can occur in Walton
and Krabbe’s (1995) PPD system and similar systems. (Here and below P stands for
proponent and O stands for opponent.)
P1 I claim that we should lower taxes
O2 Why should we lower taxes?
P3 Since lowering taxes increase productivity, which is good
O4 I concede that increasing productivity is good,
O5 but why do lower taxes increase productivity?
P6 Since professor P, who is an expert in macro-economics, says so
The argument built during this dialogue is the one on the left in Fig. 1.
AI has added to this the possibility of counterargument: an argument can in AI
models also be criticised by arguments that contradict a premise or conclusion of an
argument or that claim an exception to its inference. The logic assumed by AI
models of argumentative dialogues is thus nonmonotonic, since new information
can give rise to new counterarguments that defeat previously justified arguments.
Nevertheless, in most AI models it is still argument-based, since counterarguments
conform to the same inferential structure of the arguments that they attack.
In our example, counterarguments could be stated as follows:
O7 But professor P is biased, so his statement does not support that lower taxes
increase productivity
Fig. 1 An argumentation framework
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P8 Why is professor P biased?
O9 Since he has political ambitions, and people with political ambitions cannot
be trusted when they speak about taxes
O10 Moreover, we should not lower taxes since doing so increases inequality in
society, which is bad
The argument built in O7 and O8 argues that there is an exception to the
argument scheme from expert testimony applied in P6, applying the critical question
whether the expert is biased (this paper’s account of argument schemes is essentially
based on Walton 1996). A second counterargument is stated at once in O10,
attacking the conclusion of the initial argument. Both arguments are also displayed
in Fig. 1.
3 Theory Building Dialogues
Now it can be explained why the inferential structures presupposed by a dialogue
system for persuasion need not be argument-based but can also conform to some
other kind of inference. Sometimes the most natural way to model an inferential
problem is not as argumentation (in the inferential sense) but in some other way, for
example, as abduction, statistical reasoning or coherence-based reasoning. How-
ever, inferential problems modelled in this way can still be the subject of persuasion
dialogue, that is, of a dialogue that is meant to resolve a conflict of opinion. In short:
the ‘logic’ presupposed by a system for persuasion dialogue can but need not be an
argument-based logic, and it can but need not be a logic in the usual sense.
This is captured by the idea of theory-building dialogues. This is the idea that
during a dialogue the participants jointly construct a theory of some kind, which is
the dialogue’s information state at each dialogue stage and which is governed by
some notion of inference. This notion of inference can be based an argumentation
logic, on some other kind of nonmonotonic logic, on a logical model of abduction,
but also on grounds that are not logical in the usual sense, such as probability
theory, connectionism, and so on. The dialogue moves operate on the theory (adding
or deleting elements, or expressing attitudes towards them), and legality of
utterances as well as termination and outcome of a dialogue are defined in terms of
the theory.
4 Some Design Principles for Systems for Theory-Building
Persuasion Dialogues
I now sketch how a dialogue system for theory-building persuasion dialogues can be
defined. My aim is not to give a precise definition but to outline some principles that
can be applied in defining such systems, with special attention to how they promote
relevance and coherence in dialogues. A full formal implementation of these
principles will require non-trivial work (in Sect. 5 two systems which implement
these principles will be briefly discussed).
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Throughout this section I shall use Bayesian probabilistic networks (BNs) as a
running example. Very briefly, BNs are acyclic directed graphs where the nodes
stand for probabilistic variables which can have one of a set of values (for example,
true or false if the variable is Boolean, like in ‘The suspect killed the victim’) and
the links capture probabilistic dependencies, quantified as numerical conditional
probabilities. In addition, prior probabilities are assigned to the node values
(assigning probability 1 to the node values that represent the available evidence).
The posterior probability concerning certain nodes of interest given a body of
evidence can then be calculated according to the laws of probability theory,
including Bayes’ theorem. Below I assume that the dialogue is about whether a
given node (the dialogue topic) in the BN has a posterior probability above a given
proof standard. For example, for the statement that the suspect killed the victim it
could be a very high probability, capturing ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
The first principle then is that the communication language and protocol are
defined such that each move operates on the theory underlying the dialogue. A move
can operate on a theory in two ways: either it extends the theory with new elements
(in a BN this can be a variable, a link, a prior probability or a conditional
probability) or it expresses a propositional attitude towards an element of the theory
(in a BN this can consist of challenging, conceding or retracting a link, a prior
probability or a conditional probability). This is the first way in which a system for
theory-building dialogues can promote relevance, since each utterance must
somehow pertain to the theory built during the dialogue.
The second principle is that at each stage of a dialogue the theory constructed
thus far gives rise to some current outcome, where the possible outcome values are
at least partially ordered (this is always the case if the values are numeric). For
example, in a BN the current outcome can be the posterior probability of the
dialogue topic at a given dialogue stage. Or if the constructed theory is an
argumentation framework in the sense of Dung (1995), then the outcome could be
that the initial claim of the proponent is justified, defensible or overruled (where
justified is better than defensible, which is better than overruled). Once the notion of
a current outcome is defined, it can be used to define the current winner of the
dialogue. For example, in a BN proponent can be defined the current winner if
the posterior probability of the dialogue topic exceeds its proof standard while
the opponent is the current winner otherwise. Or in an argumentation logic the
proponent can be defined the current winner if his main claim is justified on the
basis of the current theory, while the opponent is the winner otherwise. These
notions can be implemented in more or less refined ways. One refinement is that the
current outcome and winner are defined relative to only the ‘defended’ part of the
current theory. An element of a theory is undefended if it is challenged and no
further support for the element is given (however the notion of support is defined).
In Prakken (2005) this idea was applied to theories in the form of argumentation
frameworks: arguments with challenged premises for which no further support is
given are not part of the ‘current’ argumentation framework. Likewise in a BN with,
for example, a link between two nodes that is challenged.
The notions of a current outcome and current winner can be exploited in a
dialogue system in two ways. Firstly, the ordering on the possible values of the
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outcome can be used to characterize the quality of each participant’s current
position, and then the protocol can require that each move (or each attacking move)
must improve the speaker’s position. For dialogues over BNs this means that each
(attacking) utterance of the proponent must increase the posterior probability of the
dialogue topic while each (attacking) utterance of the opponent must decrease it.
This is the second way in which a protocol for theory-building dialogues can
promote relevance. The notions of current outcome and winner can also be used in a
turntaking rule: this rule could be defined such that the turn shifts to the other side as
soon as the speaker has succeeded in becoming the current winner. In our BN
example this means that the turn shifts to the opponent (proponent) as soon as the
posterior probability of the dialogue topic is above (below) its proof standard. This
rule was initially proposed by Loui (1998) for dialogues over argumentation
frameworks, in combination with the protocol rule that each utterance must improve
the speaker’s position. His rationale for the turntaking rule was that thus
effectiveness is promoted since no resources are wasted while fairness is promoted
since as soon as a participant is losing, she is given the opportunity to improve her
position. The same rule is used in Prakken (2005). This is the third way in which a
dialogue system for theory-building dialogues can promote relevance.
5 Two Example Systems
In this section I summarise two recent systems of the theory-building kind that I
developed in collaboration with others: Joseph and Prakken (2009) system for
discussing norm proposals in terms of a coherence network, more fully described in
Joseph (2010), and Bex and Prakken’s (2008) system for discussing crime scenarios
formed by causal-abductive inference, more fully described in Bex (2011).
5.1 Discussing Norm Proposals in Terms of Coherence
Paul Thagard (e.g. 2002) has proposed a coherence approach to modelling cognitive
activities. The basic structure is a ‘coherence graph’, where the nodes are
propositions and the edges are undirected positive or negative links (‘constraints’)
between propositions. For example, propositions that imply each other positively
cohere while propositions that contradict each other negatively cohere. And a
proposal for an action that achieves a goal positively coheres with that goal while
alternative action proposals that achieve the same goal negatively cohere with each
other. Both nodes and edges can have numerical values. The basic reasoning task is
to partition the nodes of a coherence graph into an accepted and a rejected set. Such
partitions can be more or less coherent, depending on the extent to which they
respect the constraints. In a constraint satisfaction approach a partition’s coherence
can be optimized by maximising the number of positive constraints satisfied and
minimising the number of constraints violated. This can be refined by using values
of constraints and nodes as weights.
Building on this, Joseph (2010) proposes to model intelligent agents as
coherence-maximising entities, combining a coherence approach with a Belief-
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Desire-Intention architecture of agents. Among other things, Joseph models how
agents can reason about the norms that should hold in the society of which they are
part, given the social goals that they want to promote. She then defines a dialogue
system for discussions on how to regulate a society (extending the preliminary
version of Joseph and Prakken 2009). The system is for theory-building dialogues in
which the theory built is a coherence graph. The agents can propose goals or norms
and discuss related matters of belief. The notions of current outcome and winner are
defined in terms of the agents’ preferred partitions of the coherence graph, which for
each agent are the partitions with an accepted set that best satisfies that agent’s norm
proposals and best promotes its social goals: the more norms satisfied and the more
goals promoted, the better the partition is.
5.2 Discussing Crime Scenarios in Terms of Causal-Abductive Inference
Building on a preliminary system of Bex and Prakken (2008); Bex (2011) proposes
a dialogue system for dialogues in which crime analysts aim to determine the best
explanation for a body of evidence gathered in a crime investigation. Despite this
cooperative attitude of the dialogue participants, the dialogue setting is still
adversarial, to prevent the well-known problem of ‘tunnel vision’ or confirmation
bias, by forcing the participants to look at all sides of a case.
The participants jointly construct a theory consisting of a set of observations plus
one or more explanations of these observations in terms of causal scenarios or
stories. This joint theory is evaluated in terms of a logical model of causal-abductive
inference (see e.g. Console et al. 1991). In causal-abductive inference the reasoning
task is to explain a set of observations O with a hypothesis H and a causal scenario
C such that H combined with C logically implies O and is consistent. Clearly, in
general more than one explanation for a given set of observations is possible. For
example, a death can be caused by murder, suicide, accident or natural causes. If
alternative explanations can be given, then if further investigation is still possible,
they can be tested by predicting further observations, that is, observable states of
affairs F that are not in O and that are logically implied by H ? C. For example, if
the death was caused by murder, then there must be a murder weapon. If in further
investigation such a prediction is observed to be true, this supports the explanation,
while if it is observed to be false, this contradicts the explanation. Whether further
investigation is possible or not, alternative explanations can be compared on their
quality in terms of two criteria: the degree to which they conform to the
observations (evidence) and the plausibility of their causal scenarios.
Let me illustrate this with the following dialogue, loosely based on a case study
of Bex (2011), on what caused the death of Lou, a supposed victim of a murder
crime.
P1 Lou’s death can be explained by his fractured skull and his brain damage,
which were both observed. Moreover, Lou’s brain damage can be explained by
the hypothesis that he fell
O2 But both Lou’s brain damage and his fractured skull can also be explained by
the hypothesis that he was hit on the head by an angular object
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P3 If that is true, then an angular object with Lou’s DNA on it must have been
found, but it was not found
In P1 a first explanation is constructed for how Lou died, and in O2 an alternative
explanation is given. The latter is clearly better since it explains all observations,
while the first fails to explain Lou’s fractured skull. Then P3 attacks the latter
explanation by saying that one if its predictions is contradicted by other evidence.
The resulting causal-abductive theory is displayed in Fig. 2, in which boxes with a
dot inside are the observations to be explained, solid boxes without dots are
elements of hypotheses, the dotted box is a predicted observation, solid arrows
between the boxes are causal relations and the dotted link expresses contradiction.
This theory contains two alternative explanations for Lou’s death, namely, the
hypotheses that Lou fell and that he was hit with an angular object, both combined
with the causal relations needed to derive the observations (strictly speaking the
combination of the two explanations also is an explanation but usually only minimal
explanations are considered).
But this is not all. In Sect. 4 I said that, by way of refinement, parts of a theory
built during a dialogue may be challenged and must then be supported, otherwise
they should be ignored when calculating the current outcome and current winner. In
fact, Bex here allows that support for elements of a causal-abductive theory is given
by arguments in the sense of an argumentation logic. Moreover, he defines how such
arguments can be constructed by applying argument schemes, such as those for
witness or expert testimony, and how they can be attacked on the basis of critical
questions of such schemes. So in fact, the theory built during a dialogue is not just a
causal-abductive theory but a combination of such a theory with a logical
argumentation framework in the sense of Dung (1995).
Consider by way of illustration the following continuation of the above dialogue.
(Here I slightly go beyond the system as defined in Bex (2011), which does not
allow for challenging elements of a causal-abductive theory with a ‘why’ move but
only for directly moving arguments that support or contradict such elements.)
Fig. 2 A causal-abductive theory
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O4 But how do you know that no angular object with Lou’s DNA on it was
found?
P5 This is stated in the police rapport by police officer A
P6 By the way, how do we know that Lou had brain damage?
O7 This is stated in the pathologist’s report and he is an expert on brain damage
P8 How can being hit with an angular object cause brain damage?
O9 The pathologist says that it can cause brain damage, and he is an expert on
brain damage
O10 By the way, how can a fall cause brain damage?
First O4 asks for the ground of P’s statement that no angular object with Lou’s
DNA on it was found, which P5 answers by an application of the witness testimony
scheme. Then P6 asks where the observation that Lou had brain damage comes
from, which O7 answers with an argument from expert testimony. Then P8
challenges a causal relation in O’s explanation, which O9 then supports with
another argument from expert testimony. In his turn O10 challenges a causal
relation in P’s explanation, which P fails to support. The resulting combination of a
causal-abductive theory with an ‘evidential’ argumentation framework is displayed
in Fig. 3 (here shaded boxes indicate that the proposition is a premise of an
argument, and links without arrows are inferences, in this case applications of
argument schemes).
To implement the notions of a current outcome and current winner, Bex (2011)
first defines the quality of causal explanations in terms of two measures: the extent
to which they explain, are supported or are contradicted by the evidence, and the
extent to which the causal relations used in the explanation are plausible. Roughly,
Fig. 3 A causal-abductive theory combined with an argumentation framework
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the plausibility of a causal relation is reduced by giving an argument against it, and
it is increased by either defeating this argument with a counterargument or directly
supporting the causal relation with an argument. (Bex also defines how the
plausibility of an explanation increases if it fits a so-called story scheme, but this
will be ignored here for simplicity.) Then the current outcome and winner are
defined in terms of the relative quality of the explanations constructed by the two
participants. It is thus clear, for instance, that P3 improves P’s position since it
makes O’s explanation being contradicted by a new observation. Likewise, O4
improves O’s position since it challenges this new observation, which is therefore
removed from the currently defended part of the causal-abductive theory and so
does not count in determining the current quality of O’s explanation, which
therefore increases. In the same way, P8 improves P’s position by challenging a
causal relation in O’s explanation, after which O9 improves O’s position by
supporting the challenged causal relation with an argument (note that in this
example the criterion for determining the current winner, that is, the proof standard,
is left implicit).
A final important point is that the arguments added in Fig. 3 could be
counterattacked, for instance, on the basis of the critical questions of the argument
schemes from witness and expert testimony. The resulting counterarguments could
be added to Fig. 3 in the same way as in Fig. 1. If justified, their effect would be that
the statements supported by the attacked arguments are removed from the set O of
observations or from the set C of causal relations. In other words, these would not be
in the defended part of the causal-abductive theory and would thus not count for
determining the current outcome and winner. For example, if O succeeds in
discrediting police officer A as a reliable source of evidence, then the quality of O’s
position is improved since its explanation is no longer contradicted by the available
evidence.
6 Conclusion
This paper has addressed the relation between formal-logical and formal-dialogical
accounts of argumentation. I have argued how persuasive argumentation as a kind
of dialogue is possible without assuming arguments (and counterarguments) as
inferential structures. The motivation for this paper was that the object of a conflict
of opinion (which persuasion dialogues are meant to resolve) cannot always be most
naturally cast in the form of arguments but sometimes conforms to another kind of
inference, such as abduction, statistical reasoning or coherence-based reasoning. I
have accordingly proposed the notion of a theory-building argumentation dialogue,
in which the participants jointly build a theory that is governed by some notion of
inference, whether argument-based or otherwise, and which can be used to
characterize the object of their conflict of opinion. I then proposed some principles
for designing systems that regulate such dialogues, with special attention for how
these principles promote relevance and coherence of dialogues. Finally, I discussed
two recent dialogue systems in which these ideas have been applied, one for
dialogues over connectionist coherence graphs and one for dialogues over theories
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of causal-abductive inference. The discussion of the latter system gave rise to the
observation that sometimes theories that are not argument-based must still be
combined with logical argumentation frameworks, in order to model disagreements
about the input elements of the theories.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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